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a b s t r a c t
In almost all of the maritime territorial disputes in East Asia, fisheries questions play a significant role.
One need only consider that fishing has been at the heart of serious wrangling among East Asian states
from the Yellow Sea, through the East China Sea, and down to the South China Sea in recent years.
Chinese fisheries policy might be critical to the possibilities for peaceful resolution of the many
maritime territorial disputes in East Asia. Moreover, China’s status as the world’s largest fishing power
also means that Beijing’s inclination to accept and practice global fisheries norms could mark a giant
step forward for environmental protection of the oceans in the coming century. Drawing on a wide
array of unique Chinese Mandarin-language sources, this study seeks to explore the often noted
‘‘implementation gap’’ in Chinese fisheries enforcement practices. The study reveals that Beijing is
making gradual and earnest efforts to comply with international environmental norms with respect to
fisheries. That is a positive development for the health of the world’s oceans, but some of these same
policies may also have the impact of aggravating tense maritime disputes in the region as well.
& 2013 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
1. Introduction
New strains in East Asia reflect geopolitical maneuvering in a
landscape altered, above all, by the steady and dramatic rise of
China over the last three decades. The maritime domains of East
Asia are developing as areas of acute tension, because this is
where great powers and also smaller states come into regular
contact, the legal principles to regulate their conduct are some-
what ambiguous, and also because of the considerable resources
at stake. In almost all of the maritime territorial disputes in East
Asia, fisheries questions play a significant role.
One need only consider that fishing has been at the heart of
serious wrangling among East Asian states from the Yellow Sea,
through the East China Sea and down to the South China Sea over
this past year. In December 2011, a Chinese fisherman killed a
South Korean Coast Guardsman, rocking a relationship that has
been troubled since at least the spring 2010 sinking of the South
Korean frigate Cheonan [1]. In September 2010, another fishing
incident sparked a dramatic crisis between China and Japan. After
the Japan Coast Guard arrested a Chinese fisherman for seemingly
reckless navigation practices near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu
islands, Beijing is alleged to have threatened Tokyo with a cut-off
in supplies of critical rare earth minerals—a major shock to the
bilateral relationship [2]. During 2012, Chinese fisheries cutters
appear to have increased patrols in the disputed East China Sea
claim area. Moreover, fisheries has been raised as a key issue
dividing the many disputants of the South China Sea and has indeed
played a conspicuous role in the on-going crisis that erupted in
spring 2012 between China and the Philippines regarding Huangyan
Island/Scarborough Shoal.
The above list of troubling episodes strongly suggests that
Chinese fisheries policy might be critical to the possibilities for
peaceful resolution of the many maritime territorial disputes in
East Asia. Moreover, China’s status as the world’s largest fishing
power also means that Beijing’s inclination to accept and practice
global fisheries norms could mark a giant step forward for environ-
mental protection of the oceans in the coming century. With both
strategic and also environmental concerns in mind, therefore, this
paper endeavors to evaluate China’s efforts to regulate its marine
fisheries, to discuss the future prospects and challenges for this
regulation and finally to outline various implications of this effort.
2. Materials and methods
Chinese fisheries experts are active in global fisheries and
maritime policy fora and they have collectively sought to offer
English-language readers a window into Chinese fisheries man-
agement and various related challenges. In their important 2008
article in Marine Policy, for example, researchers Yu Huiguo and
Yu Yunjun noted China’s ‘‘overexploitation and misuse of marine
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coastal resources as well as marine pollution’’ [3]. Among the
methods that they highlighted in Beijing’s efforts to try to address
this dismal situation, included: (1) the fishing license system,
(2) the mid-summer fishing moratorium, (3) the ‘‘zero growth’’
policy, (4) limitations on fishing-boat size, (5) a fishing boat
scrapping program and (6) initiatives to combat illegal, unre-
ported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. That important article by
Yu and Yu offers crucial insights into these many aspects of the
Chinese fisheries challenge, but as in many analyses by mainland
Chinese authors, the paper makes no mention of the many
international conflicts that are closely connected to fisheries in
East Asia.
This paper will not only seek to update the good scholarship by
Yu and Yu, but also to integrate a discussion of Chinese fisheries
practices within a wider regional context where serious interna-
tional disputes are regrettably the norm. The present effort will,
moreover, focus on what Yu and Yu term the ‘‘implementation
gap’’—namely the problem of Chinese fisheries enforcement
practices. As such, the narrow institutional focus of this paper is
on the Chinese Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (FLEC),
which is part of the Bureau of Fisheries Management within the
Chinese Ministry of Agriculture. This manuscript draws upon a
host of rather unique sources—including a wide variety of
writings in Mandarin Chinese. Of these materials, the most
important to note is the 2010 [China Fisheries Year-
book 2010]. This annual report of the Agriculture Ministry in
China suggests that the Chinese government is more transparent
that many realize. Given the immense ecological and strategic
importance of these issues and the wide availability of such
materials, this article may serve to spark the interest of foreign
scholars to closely examine Chinese fisheries enforcement prac-
tices and thus encourage peaceful and environmentally sustain-
able solutions to the various regional maritime disputes.
3. Background
Before endeavoring to paint a fuller picture of the present
situation in Chinese fisheries, it will be worthwhile to briefly
present some background, especially focusing on developments of
the last two decades. In addressing the issue of fisheries manage-
ment, one should note that that from the earliest days of the PRC,
the escort of China’s fishing fleets was viewed as a core mission of
the Chinese Navy [4]. In the aftermath of the devastating Cultural
Revolution, the Chinese Navy began to consider more ambitious
tasks and state institutions (including the armed forces) were
generally reduced in capacity, in part to facilitate the growth of
private entities. As originally developed in the 1970s, the fisheries
service actually reported directly to both the State Council and
also the Central Military Commission, reflecting the long-held
belief that marine fisheries issues constituted a national security
problem for China [5].
Regulatory neglect ensued as a strong emphasis was placed on
ever-increasing production targets. For Chinese fisheries, the new
and relentless pursuit of profit put in place by Deng Xiaoping
resulted in a massive expansion in Chinese fishing effort and
catch. In 1985, China entered the realm of the fishing powers by
launching its first fleet of long-distance fishing vessels [6]. This
dramatic growth in effort resulted in an almost fivefold increase
in marine fisheries catch by 2000.
While fisheries protection efforts in the PRC go back as far as
1955 when a trawler restricted line was established by the State
Council, it is also clear that many of the positive, preliminary steps
toward conservation were ignored during the headlong rush for
economic growth of the 1980s and early 1990s. A major shift
occurred in the late 1990s with Beijing adopting a series of important
reform measures, including the inauguration of the summer fishing
ban in the Yellow and East China Seas in 1995, the adoption of an
explicit policy to favor aquaculture while ‘‘stabilizing’’ marine fish-
eries in 1996, as well as new fisheries agreements with Japan in 1997
and South Korea in 1998. The most important step in this reform
process, however, appears to be the ‘‘zero growth’’ plan to control
fishing capacity adopted in 1999, along with a measure to spread the
summer fishing bans to both the Bohai and also the South China Sea
(including notably both Hong Kong and Macau). With respect to
enforcement capacity, the China Maritime Surveillance (CMS) was
created in 1998 with the mission, closely related to fisheries
enforcement, of protecting China’s extensive Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ) from various forms of encroachment. In 2000, a Fisheries
Law Enforcement Command (FLEC) center was established ‘‘in order
to bring Chinese fisheries management in line with international
standards and to meet domestic needs for the centralization of
fisheries management’’ [7]. Other achievements of this period of
reform included: a fisheries agreement with Vietnam, the extension
of fishing bans to parts of the Yangtze River, and also an ambitious
effort to create marine protected areas [8].
It is not certain at this point what leaders or bureaucratic
constellation enabled the above sweeping reforms, but one may
speculate that – as elsewhere in global fisheries – that a deep
crisis in the form of depleted stocks likely spurred the above
actions. The kind of data at the heart of this crisis included the
revelation that since the 1960s, fish species in the Beibu Gulf (Gulf
of Tonkin) area of the South China Sea had declined from 487 to
238. The same study revealed that stock density had reached its
lowest level in 1998 at just 16.7% of that compared to the level of
1962 [9]. Suggesting that the crisis would not be easily remedied,
Chinese fisheries expert Prof. Mu Yongtong wrote in 2006: ‘‘Now,
the fact is obvious that the development of our nation’s fishing
industry has reached an extremely important juncture. Most – if
not all – of the fisheries have been fully exploited, and many are
already exhausted’’ [10].
A different perspective on this crisis emerges from a study by
faculty of the Maritime Police (China Coast Guard) Academy in
Ningbo that was published in 2007 and which received ample
attention in diverse parts of the Chinese government. The authors
asserted that Chinese fisheries suffered from significant foreign
encroachment, explaining that, for example, fishermen from
Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines were taking advantage of
the summer time ban on Chinese fishermen in the South China Sea
to take a larger catch for themselves [11]. The authors maintained
that part of China’s problem in fisheries enforcement was related
to the division of labor in maritime enforcement among ‘‘five
dragons stirring up the sea,’’ rather than the centralized enforce-
ment (e.g. coast guard) wielded by states such as Japan or the
United States. As an illustration of the problem, the Ningbo
Academy faculty suggest the apparently common place problem
in Chinese maritime enforcement of ‘‘ , ’’
[Jurisdiction without visibility versus visibility without jurisdic-
tion] [12]. In other words, the balkanized nature of Chinese
maritime enforcement into at least five different departments, of
which the FLEC of the Agriculture Ministry is just one major entity
and not at all the most potent, has seemingly contributed to the
present crisis in Chinese fisheries and the weakness of fisheries
enforcement.
4. Results
Before describing the current situation of Chinese fisheries
enforcement, it will be useful to review the current data regarding
the state of Chinese marine fisheries activity from the China
Fishing Yearbook 2010. Wider discussion of this data by global
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fisheries experts and marine scientists may result in a better
understanding of Pacific fisheries conditions more generally.
4.1. Chinese Fisheries data
The total marine catch for 2009 was 11,786,109 t, up 2.5% from
2008. The catch of pelagic fishes for 2009 was reported to be
8,040,286 t, up 1.8% from 2008. The take of shellfish for 2009 was
reported as 2,018,924 t, up 3.8% from 2008 [13]. Among the three
basic regions encompassing Chinese fisheries, the East China Sea
yielded the largest catch, followed by the Bohai/Yellow sea areas,
and with the South China Sea somewhat lower than these other
areas. While each of these sea areas registered higher catches, it is
interesting to observe that the South China Sea area witnessed the
smallest increase of .4% [14]. Measured by earnings, the provinces
of Zhejiang, Shandong and Fujian were by far the largest in that
order in the marine fisheries sectors [15]. It is also worth noting
that countrywide and including aquaculture, fishermen from
these same provinces also brought home some of the highest
salaries when compared to other provinces [16].
Breaking down further the catch of pelagic fish by Chinese
fishermen, the largest catch for 2009 by significant margin was of
hairtail at 1,172,440 t, a slight decline from 2008. Blue round
carangid, anchovy, Spanish mackerel, silver pomfret and small
yellow croaker followed in that order, varying between 350,000
and 550,000 t. However, the largest catch increases did not
involve any of those large fisheries. Rather, major catch increases
were of mullet, porgy, spotted maigre, black scraper, and sand
lance—all of which increased 10–20% in 2009. The largest catch
declines for 2009 were of bamboo pod fish, chub mackerel,
anchovy, and pacific herring. The decline for anchovy amounted
to20.8% [17].
With respect to shellfish, the large shrimp catch was up 5.6% in
2009, rising to a total of 1,475,426 t. The crab catch was down
slightly to 543,498 t. The squid catch increased slightly to
351,778 t in 2009. Prawns were reported to increase the most
(20%), while the take of algae saw the steepest decline in this
reported data (38.75%) [18].
China was officially reported to have just over a million fishing
boats, of which 672,633 are motorized and 430,835 are involved
in marine fisheries, including 1570 large fishing vessels, 68,538
medium-sized fishing vessels and 360,727 small fishing boats.
Despite policy intention to decrease fishing capacity, both num-
bers of boats and also tonnage are reported to have increased
from 2008 to 2009. A few provinces, including Guangxi, Shandong
and Guangdong succeeded in reducing fishing tonnage, but others
such as Zhejiang and especially Jiangsu saw major increases [19].
Of the almost 11.8 million tons of marine catch landed by Chinese
fishermen, nearly half were made by trawlers. The second most
common fishing technique were the use of gill nets at 21.9% of the
catch. Only 6.4% of the total Chinese catch was made by purse
seiners.
Concerning China’s distant water fishing fleet (DWF), the total
catch for 2009 was reported to be 977,226 t, of which more than
half was sold in foreign markets. China’s DWF fleet was reported
to amount to 1456 vessels, working for 108 enterprises that fish
within the EEZs of 28 different countries.1 Significantly, this was a
substantial decline from 2008, lower in tonnage by 16% and in
profits by 12%. Such numbers do not support the contention that
Beijing is ‘‘exporting’’ its fishing difficulties, but this data could be
anomalous. Tensions with South Korea meant that no Chinese
DWF vessels were permitted to fish legally within the ROK EEZ
during 2009. The Chinese DWF remained active in the Indonesian
EEZ with 154 boats bringing in 140,000 t of fish. Noting a
complete withdrawal from fishing grounds proximate to Pakistan
and Sri Lanka, the Chinese DWF apparently maintained its
position in waters off of Myanmar, India, Malaysia, the Philip-
pines, Thailand and Oman. The Chinese DWF continues its focus
on West African waters with EEZ agreements with 10 different
nations in that region. 375 Chinese fishing boats were said to have
worked in West African waters in 2009, catching 190,000 t of fish.
Recognizing the dilapidated condition of some of these Chinese
DWF working in African waters, a number of new trawlers are being
added. China’s DWF effort in the Indian Ocean was apparently
severely impacted by pirate activity in that region and thus suffered
a 30% decline in production [20]. The Chinese DWF apparently
added five vessels to its tuna fleet that caught 165,000 t in 2009, an
increase of 29% over 2008. This sector of the DWF appears to be
most profitable, not surprisingly. 378 Chinese DWF vessels were
involved in squid fishing in international waters, but there appears
to be substantial turmoil in this sector as both catch and profits
were down dramatically in 2009—58% and 46% respectively. Indeed,
the Chinese Fisheries 2010 Yearbook reports that North Pacific squid
fisheries witnessed ‘‘an all-time historical low in production.’’ The
five provinces supporting the most DWF boats were Fujian, followed
by Liaoning, Shanghai, Guangdong and Zhejiang in that order of
magnitude. Of the DWF total catch tonnage, 16.9% were for tuna and
17.6% was squid [21]. One Chinese fisheries expert concluded
recently that Beijing was making major efforts to better control
and regulate its DWF fleet [22].
4.2. Chinese Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (FLEC)
The same annual report that yielded the catch data above
suggests that the FLEC had 2165 enforcement vessels of all sizes
in 2009 with a total force equivalent of 55,453 t. The force was
reported to have lost 144 ships (3358 t) since 2008 [23]. In terms
of human capital, the FLEC has 35,093 personnel. Apart from
a headquarters unit of 865 persons, they are spread among all
of China’s provinces. Maritime provinces, such as Shandong,
Guangdong and Zhejiang have the largest detachments not
surprisingly, but reflecting the growing importance of aquaculture
in China’s national economy, inland provinces such as Jiangxi,
Sichuan and Yunnan all have FLEC detachments of over one
thousand personnel [24].
Illustrating an apparent consensus in the Chinese government
that includes the influential military, there is a strong conviction
that Chinese maritime enforcement forces are too weak, espe-
cially relative to other Pacific maritime powers [25]. The
announcement in October 2010 by a senior official that China
would endeavor to build 30 maritime enforcement cutters over
the next 5 years was the result of this consensus [26]. Relative to
other world coast guards, this rate of production qualifies as a
very significant buildup that illustrates both the determination of
Beijing to advance in this area, but also the relative backwardness
of current forces that have long been neglected. Indeed, it has
seemed that over the last decade among the so-called ‘‘five
dragons’’ of Chinese maritime enforcement that the FLEC has
ranked among the lowest of priorities. Measured by the rate of
new, large cutters joining the force, the FLEC seems to have
ranked well behind both the Maritime Safety Administration
(MSA), the China Maritime Surveillance (CMS), or even the Border
Control Department (BCD—also known as China Coast Guard).
A recent unofficial report suggests that the FLEC has 140
ocean-going cutters with eight vessels exceeding 1000 t. This
same report observes that 202 (hereafter YZ 202) was China’s
first modern, large enforcement cutter that entered service with
1 It Is not clear whether this official aggregate number of DWF vessels
includes fishing boats that fly under flags of convenience, but one suspects that
it does not, creating the possibility that official DWF numbers may substantially
underestimate actual Chinese fishing effort.
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the FLEC in 2001. This ship had upgraded inspection capabilities
and longer range, as well as more advanced radar, communication
and navigation equipment. In recognition of the FLEC’s evident
weakness in large cutters, a 4500 t Chinese Navy rescue ship was
transferred to the FLEC in 2008 and has been designated as YZ
311. CMS and BCD also took over older Chinese Navy ships about
the same time. In terms of speed, range and tonnage, YZ 311
certainly represented a new stage for the FLEC and apparently
was immediately put to work patrolling in the more distant areas
of the South China Sea [27].
Future operations and capabilities of the FLEC, however, are
probably better understood by briefly examining the newest
cutter – much heralded in the Chinese press – designated YZ
310 that entered service in September 2010. Its speed of 22 knots
makes it the fastest cutter in service with the FLEC. The cutter is
107 m in length and has a crew of 56. At 2500 t, it is certainly
capable of deep ocean patrols and is said to have a range of
6000 km. Notably, it might be the first FLEC ship to be signifi-
cantly armed, as it is equipped with a pair of 14.5 mm rapid fire
machine guns mounted on deck, which is suggested to be a
response to the increasing threat of piracy. More important still is
that it is the first FLEC ship to have a helicopter hangar and
launching deck. Chinese maritime analysts are emphatic regard-
ing the enforcement, surveillance and rescue value of helicopters,
though aviation has traditionally been a major weakness across
Chinese maritime enforcement, especially within the FLEC [28].
As in most endeavors, capital and technology are only one part
of the equation and more often than not, human capital more
accurately determines true capability. At present, unfortunately,
little is known regarding the recruitment, education and training
of FLEC personnel. Of the approximate 33,095 employees of the
FLEC reported above, it is said that 5467 serve on board FLEC
vessels. The FLEC apparently added 2000 additional billets during
2009. 67% of FLEC personnel are now college graduates, up 11
percentage points compared to 2005 [29].
Similarly, there does not appear to be much public information
regarding FLEC patrol patterns and operations. However, some
data is available regarding ship inspections. For 2009, the FLEC
claims to have performed 4971 vessel inspections, and also
expelled 103 foreign fishing vessels illegally fishing in Chinese
waters. Although the FLEC appeared to have moderate patrol
activity, including some inspections in the vicinity of the Paracel
Islands in the South China Sea, no vessel inspections were claimed
in the sensitive Spratly Islands area [30]. In December 2012, new
Chinese civil maritime enforcement regulations seemed mainly
aimed at restricting Vietnamese fishing around the Paracels [31].
According to official data, about 300 Chinese fishermen died at
sea with the most frequent causes of death being accidents
resulting from collisions and also typhoon-related sinkings. The
FLEC was reported to have been involved in 877 rescue incidents in
2009 in which 4502 Chinese fishermen were saved. An apparent
priority for the FLEC has been to provide Chinese fishermen with
advanced communication and navigation equipment to facilitate
rescue [32]. A report in 2009 suggested that the government would
provide two-way satellite communications equipment for one mil-
lion Chinese fishing vessels [33]. The AIS system is widely functional
along the Chinese coast. Satellite vessel monitoring systems are
apparently in place, as well, to assist with enforcement [34].
According to the 2009 China Fisheries Yearbook, the FLEC first
undertook to patrol the Spratlys region of the South China Sea in
1994 and was ready at that time to both ‘‘eat bitternessy and to
y struggley’’ [35]. On the other hand, such long distance patrols
appear to be quite rare even up until the present time in light of
the major headlines accorded to the deployment of the new YZ
310 to the Spratlys region in late 2010. This vessel’s deployment
to that sensitive sea area at that time was apparently intended to
both ‘‘regularize [and] y institutionalize’’ Chinese fisheries
patrolling in the Spratly’s area of the southern South China Sea
[36]. An even more significant clue regarding FLEC patrol patterns
in the South China Sea concerns the 12 degree line, cited in at
least one Chinese official pamphlet to suggest that the summer
fishing ban is enforced north of that line, but not south of it [37].
This intriguing enforcement policy will be taken up again for
discussion in the section that follows. Relying on Vietnamese
data, as well as Chinese figures, Taylor Fravel concludes that there
was a disturbing uptick in 2009 of Chinese confiscations of Vietna-
mese fishing boats in the South China Sea, but these numbers
subsequently fell sharply in 2010 – and no cases were reported for
2011 – though an uptick may already be evident in 2012 [38]. In
November 2011, it was announced that the medium-sized FLEC
cutter YZ 306 would hence forth be based in the Paracel Islands [39].
This may serve as yet another indication that the FLEC will play a
definite role in China’s evolving strategy for the South China Sea [40].
A clear pattern of increasing FLEC patrols is evident in the South China
Sea, a point noted recently by Fravel using similar data [41].
Another rather conspicuous and likely politically motivated
deployment of FLEC ships occurred immediately after the con-
frontation with Japan in September 2010 concerning the Japan
Coast Guard taking a Chinese trawler crew into custody in the
East China Sea. The image of China FLEC cutters standing ‘‘eye-
ball to eye-ball’’ with Japanese Coast Guard cutters in the
disputed area produced significant consternation among Chinese
observers who noted that their cutters did not compare favorably
either in respect to size or capabilities [42]. FLEC cutters have also
been deployed with other civil maritime forces to the sensitive
Diaoyu/Senkaku island dispute with increasing frequency since
the fall of 2012.
While it is useful to put the analytical spotlight on the FLEC
alone among Beijing’s so-called ‘‘five dragons’’—the multiple
agencies charged with various aspects of maritime enforcement,
there is also some risk of oversimplification. For example, there
has apparently been substantial Chinese progress on integrating
various maritime enforcement capabilities to conduct fisheries
enforcement. In a couple of provinces (e.g. Guangxi), FLEC units
are reported to have completely integrated with the units of
China Maritime Surveillance (CMS), while in others (e.g. Liaon-
ing), the two forces remain quite independent [43]. Since CMS is
quite well manned and equipped (over 130 vessels) and by some
measures (e.g. aviation/ large cutters) enjoys greater prestige and
resources than the FLEC, further integration is likely to benefit
Chinese fisheries management practices [44].
5. Discussion
5.1. Positive outlook
Given the trends outlined above, it is important to state that
the overall picture is one of steady improvement in China’s
approach to fisheries management. Various and numerous pro-
blems continue to plague this system (and will be analyzed in
Section 5.2), to be sure, but China is in no sense a ‘‘rogue’’ actor in
regional and global fisheries, nor does it seem to be using fisheries
issues as lever to coerce its neighbors within a scheme of
maritime expansion, as has been alleged [45]. Among major fishing
states, Beijing does not receive top marks for fisheries manage-
ment, nor is it totally out of step with emerging maritime norms.
Beijing’s general approach actually appears to be surprisingly
rational in coping with a sector rife with unresolved conflict
between fishermen and scientists that has frequently resulted in
environmental disaster. First and foremost, the Chinese leadership
has made a series of important decisions that have set China on the
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right course. These have included the mid-1990s decision to
strongly emphasize aquaculture in order to take production and
employment pressure off of marine fisheries. Also important have
been the series of fisheries agreements that followed in that period
of major reform with key maritime neighbors. Those agreements
have resulted in many angry Chinese fishermen and they are
perhaps by nature imperfect, requiring constant fine-tuning, but
they have crucially created a strong institutional framework and
enduring precedent for regional cooperation in fisheries manage-
ment. The ‘‘zero growth plan’’ adopted in 1999 stands as a land-
mark decision by the Chinese leadership that cut sharply and
directly against the country’s national ethos of rapid and unceasing
growth. In that sense, the decision may warrant further case study
research for scholars interested in Chinese environmental policy.
The summer fishing bans are but one of several techniques now
used by Chinese regulators, attempting to reach a sustainable
equilibrium in marine fisheries.
The implementation gap remains, but this paper suggests that
this problem is being addressed. For example, the fact that fishing
tonnage in both Shandong and Guangdong provinces (two of the
largest marine fishing areas) decreased during 2008–09 appears
to reflect major efforts to better regulate Chinese marine fisheries.
Likewise, although the Chinese DWF fleet is active now on all the
world’s oceans, it is noteworthy that it declined in size during
2008–09 (the second year in a row) [46], suggesting again that
Beijing is actually not simply out to exploit the world’s oceans
down to the last fish. An especially critical component of China’s
apparent commitment to improving its fisheries is its robust
development and cultivation of fisheries expertise, which is
readily apparent in its many ocean policy and fisheries research
journals, as well as in its support of dedicated and robust research
efforts embodied in such quality institutions as China Ocean
University (Qingdao) or Shanghai Ocean University. Indeed, the
technocratic Chinese approach to marine resources management
is amply evident in the annual Chinese Fisheries Yearbook—a
major source for this paper. Chinese statistics have been proble-
matic for fisheries science in the past [47], but the data are now
much more credible, reporting as they do both good news and
bad. Overall, it should be recognized that the practices of Chinese
fishermen have important regional and global environmental
consequences and so continued strengthening of the China FLEC
is a crucial process not just for Chinese but also for the world.
5.2. Major challenges
Despite the generally positive outlook flowing from a series of
brave decisions in the 1990s, Chinese marine fisheries cannot yet
be described as healthy. A few positive signs have been recorded,
but overall fish stocks remain dangerously depleted and Chinese
fisheries experts remain pessimistic [48]. A fall 2011 study in
[Progress in Fishery Science] is apparently not an
exception, observing:
y fishing methods in 32 [Chinese] fishing ports [reveal]y
trawling intensity greatly exceeds the reproduction capacity of
fishery resources, and the fishing yields are of low value and
immaturity, subsistence fishing and commercial fishing show
y prominent contradictions y [but] mesh sizey and net
mouths are getting bigger y seabed and benthic organisms
are seriously damaged by ground wire of the beam framework
trawl y [49].
Another 2011 Chinese study found that pollution was a
significant reason that Bohai fish production is now just 20% of
the level as recently as the 1980s [50]. Three fundamental
problems remain, consisting of both institutional and practical
difficulties, as well as international issues (discussed in the
section to follow).
As discussed previously, a consensus among Chinese maritime
analysts holds that China’s approach of multiple maritime enfor-
cement agencies without any single ‘‘leading dragon’’ has created
a problematic situation of confusion, inefficiency and general
weakness. While some significant steps toward realizing integra-
tion among the maritime enforcement agencies have been
achieved, the outlook is not especially promising in this regard.
For example, the phenomena described in Section 4 above of
various provinces integrating maritime enforcement while others
do not, is broadly suggestive of the pervasive decentralization in
Chinese maritime enforcement that inhibits uniform and effective
fisheries management. Moreover, despite some improvements in
both personnel and capital, it seems that the development of the
FLEC is not a very high priority—well behind the robust Maritime
Safety Administration (MSA), for example. Explaining recent
fishing tensions between the ROK and China in the Yellow Sea,
Chinese fisheries experts suggest that ROK enforcement is better,
but also that their respective problem turns out to be significantly
easier, since China’s fishing fleet is more numerous and low-
tech—posing a continuing enforcement challenge for the China
FLEC.
Despite stricter enforcement measures and a variety of mea-
sures discussed above, major problems may continue to exist
within the mechanics of Chinese enforcement. Thus, a recent
report in the Chinese journal [Ocean Development
and Management] notes that four of five critical fish species
stocks off of Guangdong show no improvement under the current
regime of regulation [51]. The summer fishing ban, perhaps
China’s most fundamental control on fishing effort, is controver-
sial. One study, for example, claims that the summer ban is more
effective than restrictions on mesh size and that significant
improvements followed the 2009 decision to extend the ban from
12 weeks to 14 [52]. Other Chinese specialists, however, argue
that the summer ban fuels regional tensions (see Section 5.3
below) and needs to be replaced by a more advanced system of
tradeable quotas—a practice gaining acceptance among global
fisheries experts. Without quotas in place (and related measures),
it is reported that China has done little to track bycatch in its
fisheries—a veritable gaping hole in its effort to restore ecological
balance in its proximate seas [53]. Chinese specialists are also
very concerned about the increasing and somewhat unpredictable
impact of mariculture on coastal ecosystems [54]. Another con-
cern articulated by Chinese specialists concerns the issue of
[three nils] or illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing. It
is suggested that Chinese law and fishing agreements do not pay
adequate attention to the problem of IUU fishing. As a specialist
from Guangdong Ocean University recently notes, the problem of
IUU fishing may aggravate international tensions, especially
because IUU fishing activity often seeks to exploit the enforcement
seams in and around international maritime boundaries [55].
5.3. Disputes
The fisheries issue brings together a number of different
questions related to China’s rise in the Asia-Pacific region in a
potentially volatile mixture. These questions include China’s rapid
economic and naval development, its massive appetite for
resources, its somewhat unhurried embrace of global environ-
mental norms, and most of all the ambiguous nature of conflicting
claims all around China’s maritime periphery. Some of these
maritime territorial disputes encompass natural resources –
chiefly oil and gas – that perhaps far outweigh the profits linked
to fisheries exploitation. But the fisheries issues still come
naturally to the fore because these profits are not in the distant
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future but in the here and now, and because they involve jobs
among a vocal and often influential minority.
There is little doubt that recent tensions, mixing with bitter
historical memories and jealousies may combine to spawn a
dangerous ‘‘fishing nationalism,’’ in the related countries. Cer-
tainly, this phenomenon is amply evident in Chinese discourse.
Thus, a recent Chinese book on ‘‘emergency management’’ of
fisheries incidents asserts: ‘‘Although our country has signed one
after another fishing agreements with neighboring states, the
number of fishing industry security incidents involving foreigners
has unceasingly increasedy Some countries even send warships
to bump and sink our side’s fishing boatsy’’ [56]. Also troubling
is the seeming tendency to deploy either fishing boats (maritime
militia) and/or FLEC vessels for obviously political purposes that
are only peripherally related to fisheries. Related examples
including dangerous incidents with U.S. surveillance vessels in
March 2009 and also fall 2012 interaction in disputed areas of the
East China Sea. As recently as December 2012, the Chinese press
gave ample and seemingly positive press coverage to Chinese
fishing vessels accused of interfering with Vietnamese fossil fuel
exploration efforts in the South China Sea [57]. While disturbing
from one perspective, of course, such incidents can also be seen as
reassuring in that they suggest that China is not looking to
escalate such crises to the level of military confrontation.
Further complicating the matter, ‘‘ ’’ [weaponization] has
been identified as a major trend for the various components of
Chinese maritime enforcement including the FLEC [58]. Even
small-scale armament on the newest FLEC cutter, as described in
section four, implies a rather major departure for Chinese fisheries
enforcement vessels that have generally been unarmed. The same
report offers detailed plans regarding how Chinese fisheries cutters
might be ‘‘re-outfitted’’ in wartime for various combat missions
including anti-submarine warfare. Such a complexion for elements
of China’s maritime enforcement capabilities would not be outside
the norm for major coast guards, but is still suggestive of worrying
trends extant in the region.
Undoubtedly, a more robust FLEC comprising a large fleet of
advanced, armed cutters that wield aviation capabilities might be
viewed as a looming threat by other regional claimants in the East
Asian region. China is hardly disguising its intent to employ these
new capabilities for enforcing maritime claims, in addition to
improving fisheries management. Still, one hopeful way to
approach this development is to consider a much starker alter-
native. Would it be better if Beijing regularly dispatched naval
vessels ‘‘gray hulls’’ equipped with missiles to enforce its claims
or perhaps the ‘‘white hulls’’ of the FLEC instead? Chinese
maritime strategists, including within the military, seem to
understand that employing civil maritime enforcement ‘‘white
hulls’’ into volatile situations is less dangerous and escalatory
than the deployment of ‘‘gray hulls.’’ Another interesting aspect of
Chinese policy concerns the 121 latitude line that the FLEC
apparently employs in its enforcement activities in the South
China Sea strongly hints at a less extreme and more compromis-
ing approach to claims and resources by Beijing in the South
China Sea. Chinese fishing vessels are escorted south of this line,
but the FLEC has not taken action against foreign vessels south of
the line. This seemingly pragmatic line could point the way
toward an equitable division of the sea’s resources on the basis
of a negotiated compromise.
5.4. Cooperation
Even as fisheries disputes may form the ‘‘leading edge’’ of
intensifying struggles for resources in the Asia-Pacific region, it is
alternatively possible to consider how fisheries might simulta-
neously form one of the most pioneering and innovative aspects
of bilateral and multilateral maritime cooperation in this volatile
region. It is not widely known that quiet, technocratic cooperation
has been on-going in this area between China and various
neighbors and other important maritime powers including the
U.S. for decades [59].
A successful record of fisheries cooperation between Washing-
ton and Beijing is especially noteworthy given the other tensions
that have plagued the broader relationship. In 1993, a memor-
andum of understanding was reached between the countries to
jointly act against driftnet fishing in the North Pacific, a practice
prohibited by the United Nations. The memo established the
innovative concept of posting a Chinese FLEC ship-rider aboard a
USCG cutter in order to give the American ship the necessary
jurisdiction to enforce the UN prohibition effectively. To this point,
the FLEC has leaned upon the superior capabilities of the USCG in
cooperating to serve global environmental imperatives. China FLEC
personnel and related specialists have also visited various U.S.
fisheries enforcement training centers in Alaska and elsewhere. In
the future, however, a more robust FLEC may become a more equal
partner in this kind of cooperation, regularly dispatching one or
more high endurance cutter to patrol the waters of the North Pacific.
No doubt, this original form of cooperation has been supported by
the broader cooperative institutional framework of the North Pacific
Coast Guard Forum, enabling the USCG and various maritime
enforcement agencies including the FLEC to develop essential habits
of dialog and cooperation. Indeed, this forum has been so well
acclaimed in the difficult circumstances of Northeast Asia that it has
been suggested that a parallel and similar forum might be appro-
priate to tackle the challenges of maritime security in Southeast Asia
as well.
Some may criticize these efforts as more symbolic than
substantive, but that is not at all how such efforts are presented
in Mandarin-language (i.e. for Chinese audiences) official reports
wherein international exchanges and cooperation are actually
prioritized, for example in the China Fisheries Yearbook 2010. Thus,
the East Sea FLEC department report calls for ‘‘active development
of China–ROK and China–Japan fisheries cooperation, accelerating
bilateral trust y and enhancing the exchange of information,’’
among other objectives. It also calls for strict enforcement against
violations by Chinese fishermen of the waters of neighboring
countries [60]. This is consistent with provincial level FLEC reports
that also highlight the benefits of close international cooperation
[61]. Chinese academic fisheries experts likewise see international
cooperation as critical, for example in coping with the IUU
challenge. Overall, it seems that closer fisheries cooperation among
disputants will be crucial to the myriad maritime disputes along
China’s coast.
6. Conclusion
In outlining both the present situation in Chinese fisheries as
well as China’s record in fisheries regulation efforts, this study
endeavors to stimulate further research and debate on issues of
pivotal importance with significant environmental and strategic
implications. The conclusion of this preliminary survey of various
Chinese-language materials related to fisheries, rarely examined
by Western scholars, yields the tentative conclusion that signifi-
cant, albeit incremental progress is occurring in Chinese fisheries
enforcement practices as demonstrated by major leadership
commitment, the impressive related research apparatus, clear
efforts to improve the China FLEC in order to close the imple-
mentation gap in Chinese fisheries, and an evident Chinese
enthusiasm for bilateral and multilateral cooperation as part of
the solution to persistent fisheries problems.
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As enumerated in Section 5, major flaws are still evident in
Chinese fisheries enforcement, such as tabulating and reducing
bycatch, but the trend is generally positive for the global environ-
ment and deserves international support. In fact, Chinese success
to date in fisheries enforcement may be somewhat similar to that
of the U.S. owing to each country benefiting from relatively strong,
centralized governments. By contrast, the European Union has
been afflicted with various contradictions among its members in
developing a common and comprehensive fisheries policy [62].
To be sure, small states in dispute with China over maritime claims
will no doubt be anxious regarding a more capable FLEC that will
carry the Chinese flag more frequently and on larger vessels into
disputed waters. At this point, there is only quite limited evidence
of Beijing pushing its fishermen and enforcement vessels into
disputed zones—and this practice, while regrettable and destabi-
lizing, is still preferable to militarization. Overall, China appears to
be trying to minimize the deleterious impact of fisheries complica-
tions on relations with crucial neighbors.
Contemporary China is always looking for external models to
aid in its development process. Thus, it is not surprising to find
Chinese specialists puzzling over the lessons of the 18-year
struggle over fisheries between the United Kingdom and Iceland
in the so-called ‘‘Cod War’’ [63]. One may hope that a major
lesson of that dispute for China is that the country with the bigger
navy does not necessarily prevail in maritime disputes. However,
Westerners evaluating Chinese policies in East Asian waters also
need to recognize that current evidence suggests that Beijing is, as
in many countries, facing a wave of discontent among fishermen,
but still making gradual but earnest efforts to comply with
emerging international norms regarding maritime governance.
Strategists may perhaps have legitimate qualms about enhanced
Chinese fisheries enforcement capabilities, but environmentalists
should be relieved to know that Beijing will exercise restraint in
exploiting the resources of the world’s oceans.
References
[1] Sang-hun C. Chinese fisherman kills South Korean coast guardsman. New
York Times, 12 December 2011.
[2] Bradsher K. Amid tension, China blocks vital export to Japan. New York
Times, 22 September 2010.
[3] Yu H, Yu Y. Fishing capacity and management in China: theoretic and
practical perspectives. Mar Policy 2008;32:351–7.
[4] Swanson B. Eighth voyage of the dragon: a history of China’s quest for
seapower. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press; 1982 p. 221.
[5] Yin H. Development of China’s littoral law enforcement force and its
equipment. Shipborne Weapons 2011:18 March.
[6] China Fisheries Yearbook; 2009. p. 2 [in Chinese].
[7] Yin H. Development of China’s littoral law enforcement force and its
equipment. Shipborne Weapons 2011:18 March.
[8] China Fisheries Yearbook; 2009. p. 4–5 [in Chinese].
[9] Yu Y, Mu Y. The new institutional arrangement for fisheries management in
the Beibu Gulf. Mar Policy 2006;30:251.
[10] Mu Y. Fisheries management: focusing on a rights-based regime. Qingdao:
China Ocean University Press; 2006. p. 292 [in Chinese].
[11] He Z, Ren X, Feng S, Luo X, Liu J. Research on the creation of a Chinese coast
guard. Beijing: Ocean Press; 2007 p. 54 [in Chinese].
[12] He Z, Ren X, Feng S, Luo X, Liu J. Research on the creation of a Chinese coast
guard. Beijing: Ocean Press; 2007 p. 41 [in Chinese].
[13] China Fisheries Yearbook; 2010. p. 186 [in Chinese].
[14] China Fisheries Yearbook; 2010. p. 188 [in Chinese].
[15] China Fisheries Yearbook; 2010. p. 154 [in Chinese].
[16] China Fisheries Yearbook; 2010. p. 158 [in Chinese].
[17] China Fisheries Yearbook; 2010. p. 187 [in Chinese].
[18] China Fisheries Yearbook; 2010. p. 186 [in Chinese].
[19] China Fisheries Yearbook, 2010, p. 208 [in Chinese].
[20] China Fisheries Yearbook; 2010. p. 7 [in Chinese].
[21] China Fisheries Yearbook, 2010, p. 194 [in Chinese].
[22] Xue G. China’s distant water fisheries and its response to flag state
responsibilities. Mar Policy 2006;30:653.
[23] China Fisheries Yearbook; 2010. p. 207 [in Chinese].
[24] China Fisheries Yearbook; 2010. p. 221 [in Chinese].
[25] Sun J. Notes on maritime security in the new period of the new century.
China Mil Sci 2008:77 [in Chinese].
[26] China plans to build 30 maritime enforcement cutters over the next 5 years.
China News Net; 11 October 2010 [in Chinese].
[27] Yin H. Development of China’s littoral law enforcement force and its
equipment. Shipborne Weapons 2011:20 [in Chinese].
[28] He Z, Ren X, Feng S, Luo X, Liu J. Research on the creation of a Chinese coast
guard. Beijing: Ocean Press; 2007 p. 110–20 [in Chinese].
[29] China Fisheries Yearbook; 2010. p. 26 [in Chinese].
[30] China Fisheries Yearbook; 2010. p. 118 [in Chinese].
[31] Page J. China sheds light on new sea rules. Wall Street J, 5 December 2012.
[32] China Fisheries Yearbook; 2010. p. 18–9 [in Chinese].
[33] One Million Chinese Fishermen Will Be Equipped with Two Way Satellite
Communications Equipment. Xinhua Net, 22 May 2009 [in Chinese].
[34] Interviews, Qingdao, December 2011.
[35] China Fisheries Yearbook; 2009. p. 5 [in Chinese].
[36] Chen T. China fisheries enforcement vessel 310.Naval and Merchant Ships
December 2010:71 [in Chinese].
[37] Yan Y. Guardian of the ocean industry: the choice for security. Hangzhou:
Zhejiang Province Fisheries Law Enforcement Command; 2006. p. 23 [in
Chinese].
[38] Zhang Y. Stopping Vietnam’s fishing boats lawful. China Daily 2012 23 March.
[39] China initiated the basing of the first large fisheries enforcement cutter in the
Paracel Islands. Naval and Merchant Ships 2011;(11):13 [in Chinese].
[40] Goldstein L. Chinese naval strategy in the South China Sea: an abundance of
noise and smoke, but little fire. Contemp Southeast Asia 2011;3:320–47.
[41] Fravel T. Maritime security in the South China Sea and the competition over
maritime rights. In: Cronin P, editor. Cooperation from strength: the United
States, China and the South China Sea. Washington, DC: Center for New
American Security; 2012. p. 37.
[42] Hai T. China must affix cannons as it builds Its ‘second navy’. International
Herald Leader, 27 November 2010 [in Chinese].
[43] Interviews, Qingdao, December 2011.
[44] Yin H. Development of China’s littoral law enforcement force and its
equipment. Shipborne Weapons 2011:17 March.
[45] Kato Y. U.S. commander blasts Chinese Navy’s behavior. Asahi Shimbun 2010
15 June.
[46] China Fisheries Yearbook; 2009. p. 14 [in Chinese].
[47] Watson R, Pauly D. Systematic distortions in world fisheries catch trends.
Nature 2001;414:534–6.
[48] Interviews, Qingdao, December 2011.
[49] Sun Z. Investigation and analysis of trawl gears in the Yellow Sea and the
Bohai Sea area. Prog Fish Sci 2011;32:127 [in Chinese].
[50] Zhang X. Strategic research on the key technologies and development of
China’s contemporary fishing system. Beijing: China Ocean Press; 2011 p. 66
[in Chinese].
[51] Hou X. Research on the fisheries resources of the Shenzhou sea area during
the hot season moratoriums of 2007–2008. Ocean Dev Manage 2009;21:111
[in Chinese].
[52] Yan L. Effect of new summer close season of trawl fisheries on fishery ecology
and resource enhancement in East China Sea. Mar Fish 2010;32:185–91
[in Chinese].
[53] Interviews, Qingdao, December 2011.
[54] Interviews, Qingdao, December 2011.
[55] Xu H. Law and policy for controlling IUU Fishing. Ocean Dev Manage
2009;26:26 [in Chinese].
[56] Li Z. The ocean and the fishing industry: emergency management. Beijing:
Ocean Press; 2007 p. 299 [in Chinese].
[57] Liu C, Duan C. Vietnam claims harassment by Chinese boats. Global Times
2012 5 December [in Chinese].
[58] Yin H. Development of China’s littoral law enforcement force and its
equipment. Shipborne Weapons 2011;3:24 [in Chinese].
[59] Zou K. Sino-Japanese joint fishery management in the East China Sea. Mar
Policy 2003;27:125–42.
[60] China Fisheries Yearbook; 2010. p. 118–22 [in Chinese].
[61] Faithful to the law, enforcement serves the people: short report of work
concerning the investigation of illegal drift nets in the North Pacific.
Hangzhou: Zhejiang Province Fisheries Law Enforcement Command; 2009
[in Chinese].
[62] Clover C. The end of the line: how overfishing is changing the world and what
we eat. Los Angeles: University of California Press; 2006 p. 320-1.
[63] Lan Y. The cod war. Modern Ships 2010:28–31 [in Chinese].
L.J. Goldstein / Marine Policy 40 (2013) 187–193 193
